Introduction
This article reports a brief but quite comprehensive overview of new data on the levels of individual membership of political parties in contemporary European democracies. Our first intention here is simply to update the data originally reported in , and to extend their coverage to as many additional European democracies as possible. Our second intention is to assess the extent to which the trend towards declining levels of membership noted by Katz et al. at the end of the 1980s has continued through the 1990s. As that original report concluded, the evidence of membership decline through to the end of the 1980s was in fact uneven, for while the levels were almost consistently falling when measured relative to the size of the overall national electorates (the M/E ratio -total party membership taken as a percentage of the total electorate), this was not always the case when looked at in terms of the raw numbers involved. Thus, while the overall numbers of members in a number of polities had actually remained stable or had even grown in the period from 1960 to the late 1980s, they had usually failed to keep pace with the enormous expansion of electorates in this same period, and hence had registered a relative decline. What we see here now, however, when extending these data through to the end of the 1990s, is not only an accentuation of this decline in membership relative to the electorate, but also, and for the first time, a strong and quite consistent decline in the raw numbers themselves. As we show in this article, in each of the long-established European democracies, without exception, the absolute numbers of members have now fallen, and sometimes quite considerably. What we see here, in other words, is concrete and consistent evidence of widespread disengagement from party politics. In this sense, these data, however crudely aggregated, tell an important story.
For reasons indicated below, in compiling these data we have relied primarily on the parties' own official reports or estimates of their individual memberships, and we have been helped in this effort by the generous assistance of a large number of colleagues across Europe. 1 In some cases, it is obvious that these estimates or claims cannot be additionally verified by external controls. These are aggregate figures -that is, they refer to the levels of individual party membership as a whole, thus excluding consideration of the different categories of membership which often exist -and they are sometimes reported in suspiciously rounded numbers. Although these limitations are severe, there is really no other option if one is seeking to compile cross-national data on membership levels. The only major alternative to this data source is the evidence provided by mass survey research, the reliability of which is undermined by the small numbers that are involved and by the inevitable uncertainties that surround survey respondents' understanding of what party membership actually entails. In any case, as anyone researching in this area already knows, survey-based data on party membership levels are scarcely available (the most complete overview is provided by Widfeldt (1995) ). Indeed, it is striking to observe that among the huge variety of surveys that have been carried out on political attitudes and preferences in recent decades, and even among the now voluminous set of professional election studies, there are remarkably few that include questions on party membership in particular and that are also appropriate to cross-national inquiry.
For the purposes of this present report, we have based ourselves on the original data summarized in  see also , while offering an update of these figures as well as an extension to as many additional countries as possible. Throughout, however, for reasons of reliability and also because of limitations in the resources available, we have confined our coverage to European polities. In this update and extension of the original data, we have relied heavily on information gathered by the members of the Katz-Mair project, as well as by other scholars, either directly or through their published work. We cannot guarantee these data, of course. In most cases, the scholars who have provided the information have had to depend on what the parties themselves were willing to report or claim, and in some cases these are inevitably crude estimates. Nevertheless, given the expertise of the scholars involved, and the care with which they handled the information, we are reasonably assured that these are the most reliable figures that are possible to acquire. In this limited sense, they may be considered authoritative. Moreover, since they cover a large number of European polities, and since they also offer figures updated to the end of the 1990s, we hope that these data may offer a useful source for comparative party research.
That said, it should also be recognized that the parties themselves are also not very reliable sources for data on party membership. For reasons that are perhaps too complex to go into in detail in this brief overview, there exists a tendency among both political parties and political analysts to place a particularly high value on the traditional notion of the 'mass' party. That is, both party leaders and political observers tend to assume that parties, when properly functioning, will enjoy a relatively large mass membership that is drawn from a wide range of society. Conversely, parties which lack such a mass base are often seen to be in some ways elitist or even as insufficiently legitimate. Hence almost all political parties, of whatever hue, claim to be active in the pursuit of members, and become concerned if levels of affiliation appear to be in decline. Members in this sense offer a source of legitimation to parties, both within the parties themselves and also without. For this reason, parties are often likely to claim larger (active) memberships than seems in fact to be the case.
This tendency for political parties to exaggerate their membership levels can also sometimes be exacerbated by those systems of party laws and regulations that link levels or categories of public subvention to levels of party membership. One of the most noticeable and pervasive trends in party financing in recent years has been the growth in the public funding of political parties, whereby the activities of parties in parliament in almost every polity, and also those of the party organization outside parliament in many cases, are partially financed by means of a system of state subsidies. Indeed, such subsidies now constitute an important and ever-growing component of party incomes and expenditures. More often than not, these subsidies are calculated on the basis of the parties' levels of electoral support and parliamentary representation. In some cases, however, certain subsidies are specifically earmarked for particular purposes, such as educational work, media work, youth work, or whatever, and within this latter category subsidies can also be tied to levels of party membership in general, or to the levels of specific categories of membership in particular. For this reason also, parties will often have an incentive to claim higher levels of membership than is in fact the case. Not only is this seen as desirable from a normative point of view, but it may also bring certain financial benefits.
There is little the analyst of party membership can do about this. Despite the growing importance of public subventions and the increased relevance of party laws, parties remain voluntary organizations. As such, they are rarely obliged to divulge to the public the details of their internal organization and activities. Obtaining detailed information on even the inflated membership figures that are often claimed by parties is therefore difficult in itself; verifying membership figures as supplied by the parties themselves is sometimes well nigh impossible. Moreover, in some cases the parties themselves are not even aware of the details of their membership levels, since no central national register of members is maintained. 2 The choice for the analyst is therefore either to accept at more or less face value those figures that are made available by the party organizations, while accepting that these are probably exaggerated or, in some cases, merely crude estimates; or simply to do without, and to accept that little meaningful work can be done on party memberships on a comprehensive crossnational basis. For the purposes of this report, and in common with strategies adopted by previous researchers in this field, we have opted for the first alternative. Our view is that any figures, even if inflated or crudely estimated, are better than none, but we also operate on the assumption that those figures that we do report, while as authoritative as possible, should sometimes be treated with a pinch of salt.
Party Membership at the End of the 1990s: An Overview
The first set of data that we present here summarizes the overall aggregate levels of party membership in the different polities, taking the most up-todate figures that are available. 3 We report these data under two headings: first, the aggregate sum for the overall level of membership across all parties for which figures are available and, second, this same sum taken as a percentage of the relevant national electorate -the M/E ratio (see . A set of summary figures by country over time, as well as a more detailed breakdown by party, is given in the Appendix. The purpose of this first overview is simply to offer a global figure for the overall level of party membership, since it is this figure that offers the most telling indicator of the extent to which parties might be regarded as retaining a hold within the wider society. Moreover, by reporting membership as a percentage of the electorate, we have a relatively straightforward measure that is suited to cross-national comparison.
These summary figures are reported in Table 1 , covering data from twenty countries in the late 1990s and 2000 ranked in order of M/E level. The countries reported here include most of the long-established European democracies, as well as the first 'third-wave' democracies in southern Europe, and some of the most recent 'third-wave' democracies in east central Europe. Taking all twenty countries together, the mean M/E ratio is almost 5 percent, which is considerably lower than the figure of 10.5 percent recorded among a smaller group of long-established democracies by Katz et al. (1992: 334) at the end of the 1980s, which itself reflected a decline from almost 15 percent recorded at the beginning of the 1960s. At the same time, however, it is also evident that this particular distribution is somewhat skewed, with the overall mean level being exaggerated by the impact of the exceptional Austrian case, where almost 20 percent of registered electors are still claimed to be party members. Elsewhere, the M/E ratio never exceeds 10 percent, and excluding the Austrian case serves to reduce the overall mean to just 4.4 percent.
Even excluding Austria, however, quite substantial variation does exist across the remaining countries, ranging from Finland in 1998 with an M/E ratio of 9.65 percent and Norway in 1997 with 7.31 percent, to France (in 1997), Poland (in 1998), and the United Kingdom (in 1998), all of which fall below 2 percent. Nevertheless, what is perhaps most striking is that this variation bears less relation to whether the democracy in question is long established than might have been anticipated. Given that many of the parties in the newer democracies will have had to build their organizations from scratch, and given that the more recent period will probably have led to the prioritizing of electoralist as opposed to organizationally penetrative strategies, it might have been expected that membership levels in the newer democracies would still be lagging far behind those in the established democracies . Yet, this is not so evidently the case. Thus, although Greece is the only 'third wave' democracy which ranks above the 19-country mean, and although the ratio for the new democracies taken together is just 3.65 percent, the average membership in the new South European democracies -4.73 percent -is actually higher than the West European mean (excluding Austria) of 4.36 percent. In fact, it seems to be the post-communist democracies, each of which fall below the 19-country mean, rather than the recently established democracies per se, which show markedly low levels of party membership. Poland sits at the very bottom of the list, while Hungary ranks just above the United Kingdom. In addition, the mean ratio of the post-communist polities included in the present analysis amounts to just 2.84 percent. In this sense, therefore, the post-communist democracies provide the sharpest contrast with both the relatively recently established South European counterparts and the long-established liberal democracies in Western Europe.
Another interesting pattern which emerges with some degree of clarity from these simple summary figures is that of large versus small polities, with the former tending to have lower M/E ratios. If we include only the 13 longestablished democracies, for example, then the ranking in terms of M/E ratios places Germany (10th), the United Kingdom (12th), and France (13th) among the four lowest-scoring polities -the fourth country in this group is The Netherlands (11th). The five highest scoring polities, on the other hand, are, in order, Austria, Finland, Norway, Belgium and Switzerland, in none of which the size of the overall electorate currently exceeds 7.5 million. Both Ireland and The Netherlands flout this pattern, however. Ireland, with one of the smallest electorates in Europe, ranks just above Germany in terms of its M/E ratio; The Netherlands, a middle-sized country in terms of population, now has one of the lowest M/E ratios in Europe. Italy also stands out as having by far the highest M/E ratio of any of the larger European polities, although in this case the decline in membership levels in recent years is such that it may well soon conform to the apparent large country pattern. Although the patterning is not wholly unequivocal, this large versus small dichotomy does nevertheless suggest that membership levels may to some extent reflect a systemic bias, which, in turn, might also be reflected in membership levels in other forms of association and organization.
Declining Levels of Party Membership
The second set of data which we present concerns changes over time, the measure which is perhaps of most interest to contemporary party studies.
For the purposes of this brief overview, we simply present summary measures marking the change from 1980 (or from the early 1990s in the case of the post-communist democracies) to the late 1990s, with more detailed figures for three points in time -1980, 1989-90 , and the late 1990s -being reported in the Appendix. For evidence of membership levels in 1980 we have employed the original data, relying on separate published sources for the countries that were not included in that project. It should be noted, however, that extrapolations based on this evidence of change over time are probably meaningful only in the cases of the long-established democracies and, to a lesser extent, in the cases of Greece, Portugal and Spain. The limited trends that can be derived from membership figures in the post-communist democracies are as yet of doubtful value. Party membership data in post-communist democracies are generally distorted in two ways. In the first place, many of the parties are very new and still volatile formations which began their organizational lives with almost no real presence on the ground . Second, membership levels in the polities as a whole are sometimes initially inflated by the organizational legacy of the former ruling communist parties and their satellites, which, albeit in reformed versions, continued within competitive politics. The combination of both these factors makes it both more difficult and less meaningful to try to establish and interpret changes in party membership levels over time.
Changes over time in party membership levels are summarized in Table  2 , which includes data on both changes in the M/E ratio as well as in the raw numbers of members. The Table ranks the countries according to the proportionate degree of change in this latter measure. Details on the breakdown by party are reported in the Appendix. Although, as noted, complete time-series data are not always available for all parties and all countries, the trends in these data are quite unequivocal: total party membership, expressed in both absolute numbers and as a percentage of the electorate, is now markedly in decline. This can be seen in a number of ways.
In the first place, the large majority of countries have experienced a more or less substantial decline in their M/E levels since 1980. Indeed, the only countries which have bucked this trend are drawn from the group of relatively recently democratized polities, including Greece, Hungary, Slovakia and Spain. More strikingly, and without exception, a decline in M/E levels is evident in each of the long-established democracies, ranging from Austria, where the decline has exceeded 10 percent, to Germany, now including the former East German Länder, which has experienced a more muted 1.6 percent fall. Taken together, the 13 long-established democracies have seen their M/E levels fall by an average of more than 4 percent, a trend which both confirms and accentuates the earlier and more gradual pattern noted by Katz et al. When seen in relative terms, of course, this decline appears even more marked. In 1980, these 13 long-established democracies had a mean M/E ratio of 9.81; by the late 1990s this had fallen to just 5.72. In other words, by the late 1990s, M/E ratios in the long-established democracies were averaging less than 60 percent of the levels recorded just two decades previously.
The contrast between older and newer democracies in this regard is not wholly decisive, however. Portugal, for example, records a minor decline in its M/E level relative to 1980, while the Czech Republic also records quite a substantial decline relative to 1993. In the Czech case, however, the largest component in this decline can be attributed to the massive and quite predictable decline in the membership of the former Communist Party, which claimed some 350,000 members in 1993 as against 160,000 in 1999 (see Appendix). Nevertheless, even without the impact of the exceptional inheritance of the Communist Party, Czech membership levels still evidence a decline of some 35,000 members in this brief period, equivalent to a drop from some 2.52 percent of the electorate to 1.97 percent.
What is even more strikingly evident with these new data, however, is the scale of decline in the raw numbers of members. Comparing the early 1960s to the late 1980s, Katz et al. (1992: 332-3) observed no European-wide trend in this measure, with the number of countries recording a decline in overall numbers being more or less matched by those recording a growth. Indeed, the relative decline in the M/E ratio which was then noted in all but two countries was explained by the failure of membership levels to grow at the same rate as did the national electorates. By the late 1990s, however, this picture has changed completely. Thus in each of the long-established democracies the absolute number of party members has now fallen, and sometimes substantially. In France, for example, where the reliability of the data is admittedly most open to question, membership levels have fallen by more than 1 million, equivalent to almost two-thirds of the numbers recorded in 1980. In both Italy and the United Kingdom, raw numbers have fallen by more than 50 percent, and in Norway by more than 47 percent. Germany, which emerges as relatively exceptional in this regard, but which has clearly benefited from an influx of members from the former East German Länder, is the only long-established democracy in which the raw numbers of members have fallen by less than 20 percent with respect to the levels claimed in 1980. Across all 13 long-established democracies, membership levels in absolute figures have fallen by a staggering average of almost 35 percent.
What is important to recognize here is therefore not only the sheer scale of the decline, but also its consistency. Not only have national levels of party membership across all of the long-established democracies failed to keep pace with the growth in the size of the national electorates, a trend that was already apparent in the late 1980s, they now are also evidencing substantial declines in absolute numbers. Parties in western Europe are clearly losing the capacity to engage citizens in the way they once did. Across all of the longestablished democracies, these parties are simply haemorrhaging members.
As with the M/E ratio, the only countries to counter this trend and to record a substantial increase in absolute numbers of members are the more recently democratized polities: Hungary, with a modest increase of some 5 percent; Portugal, with an increase of some 17 percent; Slovakia, with an increase of almost 30 percent, albeit with respect only to 1994; Greece, with an increase of almost 167 percent; and Spain, with an increase of more than 250 percent. This in itself is hardly surprising, since, as noted above, these polities are characterized by parties which have been obliged to build their organizations more or less from scratch. What is noteworthy, however, is again the exceptional Czech case, where membership is falling even among parties other than the Communist Party.
Conclusion
Given that this brief report has been intended mainly to present an overview and an update of party membership levels in contemporary European democracies, this is not the place to try to derive any far-reaching conclusions on the changing role or style of party organizations, or to develop any systematic hypotheses which might explain the patterns which we have identified, or which might relate these patterns to other and more widespread processes of disengagement within the wider society. Suffice it to suggest that what appears to be happening to party organizations -their general withering on the ground -may well be related to the declining importance of other traditional forms of institutionalized mediation, be these churches, trade unions, or whatever. Political parties, together with other traditional and hierarchical organizations, appear to be suffering from the impact of the individualization of social and political preferences, as well as from a more general unwillingness to rely on existing institutional structures to represent and articulate what appear to be increasingly particularized demands. This is not to suggest that parties lack their own specific story. As has been already widely discussed in the literature, party membership no longer carries with it the same practical benefits for the party leadership as was the case in the heyday of the mass party. There is now simply less practical incentive for parties to build and maintain a mass membership, and in this sense it is striking to note how relatively few members there are among many of the new and alternative parties that have emerged to gain electoral support in recent years (see Appendix). Moreover, as party identities have waned, and as partisan politics itself has become eroded, individual citizens are themselves probably less likely to be willing to devote the time and energy that is often required by active party membership. A more passive membership, on the other hand, while likely to be welcomed by party leaders, is unlikely to prove attractive to ordinary voters in an increasingly depoliticized environment. For this reason it is also crucial that we learn more about precisely who is remaining within the parties, since it is this now much reduced constituency that will do much to define party identities in the future.
In terms of party membership levels, therefore, and as has already been noted with regard to patterns of electoral participation , it is precisely in the 1990s that we now witness the first substantial and consistent aggregate evidence of growing disengagement from conventional politics across western Europe. As the recent literature on values clearly attests, citizens in western Europe appear to be as supportive of the idea of democracy as ever they were. Nowadays, however, they do not appear to be quite so willing to involve themselves in actively maintaining the very institutions which democracy requires if it is to thrive.
Notes
1 We may note here that one of the most obvious benefits of the increasing professionalization and internationalization of political science in Europe has been the emergence of networks of like-minded scholars whose support can be relatively easily tapped, not to say exploited, for exercises such as this, and in preparing this regarding levels of activism within the parties, a qualification which is perhaps particularly important since we can anticipate that large numbers of members exist on paper only, and play no active role in regular organizational activities. 3 While we have tried to build as comprehensive a data set as possible, we inevitably miss membership data for some of the smaller parties as well as the more shortlived parties that have contested election during the period with which we are concerned. Given that we have included all of the major parties, however, these missing data are unlikely to have made much difference to the overall nationallevel patterns summarized here. 
